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n 10 September 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker presented his team of Commissioners. In 
his mission letter to Arias Cañete, he asked the designated Commissioner for Climate 
Action and Energy to focus on further developing EU policy for renewables in order 
to “be a world leader in this sector” and on promoting the EU Emissions Trading System “to 
ensure that we reach our climate goals in a cost-effective way”. Furthermore, he would like 
Alenka Bratušek, the designated Vice-President for Energy Union, to focus on “completing the 
internal energy market” and on “increasing competition”. 
Given the state of play in EU energy markets, this set of objectives appears to be very ambitious 
and more importantly, partially conflicting. Today, many EU member states are confronted 
with overcapacity in the power sector as a result of an electricity demand being roughly 9% 
lower than originally expected.1 Similarly, the Emissions Trading System is struggling with an 
oversupply of CO2 emissions allowances, mainly as a result of the economic downturn that 
supplied a substantial part of the intended emissions reduction. This has led to a dramatic 
price drop of CO2 allowances. It is therefore not surprising that we’re observing a strong 
decrease of wholesale electricity prices in central-western Europe2 but also in other regions.3 
This is a normal market reaction to overcapacity, low CO2 prices and a policy-induced 
deployment of renewables. Unless this will be addressed, the EU is not likely to deliver on any 
of the three EU energy policy objectives: competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability. The priorities identified by the new Commission President and the way the 
discussions are going on the 2030 energy and climate framework are a cause for concern.   
                                                   
1 The 2008-09 economic crisis was accompanied by an unparalleled drop in electricity demand. At the end of 
2012, the electricity demand in the EU-27 was still 3% lower than in 2008. Back in 2008, analysts were 
expecting an annual growth rate of 1.5% (Capros et al., 2008). Thus, the divergence between projected and 
realised values amounts to roughly 9%.  
2 In Germany, the average market price has dropped from €65.7/MWh in 2008 to €37.9/MWh in 2013 (-42%). 
A similar development can be observed in the French power exchange: prices dropped from €69.2 to 
€43.2/MWh in the same period of time (-38%). 
3 In Spain, one could observe a 31% price drop during the last five years (average price in 2013: €44.3/MWh). 
In Italy, prices decreased by 28% in the same period of time (average price in 2013: €63.0/MWh). Thus, the 
decrease in these regions was not as strong as in central-western Europe, but still significant. 
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What is wrong?  
Under the current market conditions, there will not be any market-driven investment in any 
technologies, let alone low-carbon ones. Market-driven investments are made when market 
prices are likely to remunerate an investment. This is not the case right now. Any investment 
decision taken today is backed up by dedicated support mechanisms – be it feed-in tariffs for 
renewables (and possibly in the future also for nuclear) or capacity payments for conventional 
power. Not being market-driven, i.e. not reflecting the actual situation of supply and demand, 
further adding supply to an already-saturated system will further depress wholesale power 
prices. The current approach is comparable to trying to accommodate a growing number of 
elephants in a shrinking room. 
Furthermore, demand response (i.e. consumers reacting to price signals) – often mentioned as 
a key element of the future energy system – will not evolve under the current market 
conditions. The value of decreasing consumption in times of overcapacity is close to zero, 
simply because there will be no price spikes. And in some markets, the regulator has set price 
caps and does therefore not allow for price spikes, which would encourage consumers to adapt 
their consumption pattern.  
But what is probably the most worrying development from an EU perspective is that all of 
these support schemes have one thing in common: they are designed as national policy 
instruments. Therefore, they are another nail in the coffin for the idea of having a single energy 
market, which – one might recall – holds out the promise of delivering cost-effective solutions 
by increasing cross-border competition. Already today, the internal electricity market is far 
from completed due to a high share of national taxes and levies in end-consumer prices. With 
a growing number of national subsidy mechanisms and depressed wholesale prices, the share 
of (national) taxes and levies in the overall price can only increase. 
Faced with this situation, a need for action on a European level arises. Textbooks on economics 
suggest that overcapacity will reduce itself and, as a result, wholesale prices will recover. 
Furthermore, investments in low-carbon technologies will be made once the CO2 price will 
have risen to such a level that carbon-intensive power plants have to be taken offline for 
economic reasons. This holds true only for competitive markets without state intervention, 
which is not the case for today’s electricity markets. In some markets, power producers are not 
even allowed to decommission power plants without prior consent by the regulator. But even 
assuming a highly competitive and undistorted power market, investments in capital-
intensive energy technologies such as renewables, carbon capture and storage or nuclear 
require a high and relatively stable CO2 price. Empirical evidence shows that political 
uncertainty will lead to a higher risk premium on the capital employed, which significantly 
affects total costs of capital-intensive investments. The crucial question therefore is whether 
policy-makers can credibly guarantee a high and stable CO2 price for the coming decades. It 
remains to be seen whether the Stability Reserve Mechanism for the Emissions Trading System 
can guarantee all that. 
If this is not the case, it may be the right time to re-think the current approach.  
 
What needs to be done? 
A first step is to accept that not all objectives, which Mr Juncker asked his Commissioners to 
focus on, can be pursued in the same time frame with the same priority. There are trade-offs 
to be considered. Becoming a world leader in renewables will likely require continued support 
of their deployment with dedicated policy instruments, such as a feed-in premium or green 
certificates. But this reduces the significance of the internal market as a price signal for other 
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investments, thus creating a need for corresponding instruments for the (shrinking) rest of the 
market. Completely phasing out state interventions would strengthen the internal market but 
would also make the transition to a low-carbon economy more difficult, possibly impossible. 
It may be useful to focus on fewer and more concrete objectives. One key challenge of the next 
Commission will be to deal with subsidy schemes not in a national but in a regional way.4 
Strategies should be developed for regional convergence and ultimately joint or at least 
compatible support systems. This will help to re-generate a meaningful wholesale price. A 
second key challenge will be to solve the remuneration problem of investors without 
protecting overcapacity, in the event that the revised Emissions Trading System prove not to 
be sufficiently effective. This will be important to guarantee a more efficient allocation of 
capital and re-establish a meaningful wholesale price signal. One that allows innovative and 
market-compatible solutions, such as demand-response to evolve. A third key challenge will 
be to ensure that member states actually assume their responsibilities when it comes to 
increasing interconnection infrastructure. This will reverse the questionable development in 
some markets where new supply is being added, although neighbouring markets are faced 
with overcapacity. Furthermore, this will smoothen out the variability of renewables, reduce 
the need for back-up capacity and therefore improve the cost-effectiveness of renewables. This 
should become the first and foremost priority of the European Commission. 
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4 See de Jong and Egenhofer (2014). 
